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During the past two decades, economic and social pressures have produced
significant changes in the delivery of health care in the United States. Hospitals,
in particular, have experienced a dramatic evolution in their responsibilities.
Court rulings in the 1960s, that hospital governing bodies have the duty to monitor
health care and prevent harm to patients, have received broad judicial
acceptance. * Legislative, executive and professional recognition of this duty
followed and is today evidenced by state licensure statutes, Medicare and
Medicaid regulations and the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals. No longer seen as simply providing working space for physicians,
hospitals are now expected to be active participants in the effort to provide
only quality health care. To meet this obligation, hospitals must have a well
conceived, effective system of selecting, monitoring and disciplining medical
staff members. This is a function of the physician credentialing process. Adverse
credentials action, usually in the form of a denial, limitation, suspension or
revocation of privileges, is a critical component of hospital quality assurance.
Competing with this strong societal interest to protect the patient, is
the equally compelling recognition of the right of physicians to practice their
profession free from unwarranted interference. Doctors have successfully
challenged adverse credentials actions on such diverse theories as tortious
interference with advantageous relationships, state and federal antitrust
1 See, Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 111. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert denied , 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Hellberg v. Corey , 519
P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 322,
183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982) (a hospital must ensure quality health care by
carefully selecting monitoring and continually evaluating physicians with
privileges).

violations, defamation, breach of contract, intentional infliction of mental
distress and violation of the Civil Rights Act.
2
Lying directly at the point where these competing interests converge
is the hospital. With its patients relying on it to protect their well being and
physicians relying on having access to its facilities to practice their livelihood,
the hospital cannot stray too far in favoring one concern over the other.
Controversy generally arises when a hospital becomes aware that a staff
physician's professional performance is suspect and adverse credentials action
may be required. It is then that the delicate task of balancing these interests
must be carefully undertaken. Failure to act decisively to protect the patient
will subject the hospital to the risk of corporate liability for the negligent
treatment provided by the physician. 3 On the other hand, if the hospital
overreacts to an allegation, it may find itself losing a judgment to the aggrieved
physician on one of the forementioned contract, tort or statutory causes of
action. 4
Clearly, with all that is at stake, a cogent, and professionally consistent
approach to adverse credentials actions is needed. It does not exist. Despite
efforts by the American Medical Association, 5 various state hospital
associations, ° and federal agencies 7 to develop procedural due process guidelines,
1 Chayet and Reardon, Trouble in the Medical Staff: A Practical Guide
to Hospital Initiated Quality Assurance
,






211 N.E.2d 153: Elam
,
183 Cal. Rptr. 156
4 Chayet and Reardon, supra note 2
5 Principles of Medical Ethics
,
Opinion and Reports of the Judicial Council
of the American Medical Association (1977)
6 E.g.
,
California Medical Association-California Hospital Association Uniform
Code of Hearing and Appeals Procedures (1971)
7 E.g.
,
Chief of Naval Operation (NAVOP) Instruction 6320.4 of 7Sep84

methods remain fragmented. This has the result of leaving physicians, medical
staff committees and hospital governing bodies unsure of their respective rights
and serves to turn what should be an unencumbered fact finding process into
an event filled with bluster and confusion.
This study has been undertaken to consider practical approaches to the
difficult procedural issues which arise in decredentialling cases. Part I explores
the question of whether a physician is entitled to judicial review of action which
is adverse to his or her existing clinical privileges. Specifically, does a physician
have an enforceable right to be heard before a hospital limits, suspends or revokes
his or her privileges?^ Since the answer to this question is basic to any need
to implement recommended hearing procedures, this issue is discussed at some
length. Part II turns to specific trouble spots in the hearing process and attempts
to meld the requirements of the law with the objectives of medical quality
assurance to produce an effective fair hearing plan.
I. IS A PHYSICIAN ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A HOSPITAL
DECISION TO TAKE ADVERSE CREDENTIALS ACTION?
Will a court give a physician, who has been the subject of an adverse
credentials action, an opportunity to show that the hospital's decision was unjust
or improper? Historically, the answer to this question has been largely
determined by whether the facility was characterized as a public or private
hospital; the general premise being that the internal administrative decisions
of a voluntary, private organization are not subject to judicial oversight.
9
^ While the focus of Part II of this study centers on credentials revocation,
suspension and limitation, much of the case law and underlying philosophy
is derived from situations where a physician's application for staff membership
is initially denied or a hospital refuses to renew privileges. In most
circumstances, there is no need to distinguish between these types of cases.
9 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit
,
43 Harv. L.
Rev. 993, 1027 (1930)

Although a number of jurisdictions have turned away from this philosophy, the
distinction between public and private hospitals still may have significant impact
on whether physicians may petition the courts for relief.
Private V. Public Hospitals
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in part, that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." This protective mandate includes the right to hold specific
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from governmental
interference.^ in Board of Regents v Roth
,
11 the Supreme Court considered
what types of interests were included in the constitutional concepts of property
and liberty.
The court began by noting that property interests are not created by the
Constitution, rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source. 1 2 Personal service
contracts, hospital regulations and medical staff bylaws may provide this
independent basis. 13 Thus, an explicit or implicit agreement between a hospital
and its medical staff, that clinical privileges would only be terminated for cause,
has been held to create a property interest in those privileges to which the
protection of the fourteenth amendment applied. 14
Infringement of a liberty interest under the Roth standard requires the
possibility of damage to an individual's standing in a community or imposition
iu Greene v. McElroyT"360 U.S. 474 (1959)
11 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
12 id,
13 Elbaor v Grand Prairie Hosp. Auth., 599 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D.Tex. 1984)
14 Northeast Georgia Radiology Assoc, v Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1982);
See also
,
Christhilf v Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc. Inc., 496 Fid 174
(4th Cir. 1974)

of a stigma that would foreclose his or her freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities. 1 5 Under this prong of Roth , denial or failure to
reappoint a clinician to the staff is not a basis for a claimed deprivation of liberty
if the individual remains as free as before to seek another appointment. 16 One
physician contended that the rejection of his application for staff privileges
created a permanent scar on his record, and was an "albatross" that would limit
his liberty to pursue his profession. However, the District Court in hearing his
complaint said that without a demonstration that employment opportunities
had been foreclosed, it was impossible to know whether the alleged stigma resulted
in a genuine deprivation of liberty. 1' Thus, the factual context in which the
adverse action is taken has significant bearing on whether constitutional interests
are involved.
There is little doubt that so far as public hospitals are concerned, the
fourteenth amendment (or fifth amendment in the case of federally operated
facilities) applies and the liberty and property interests defined by Roth will
be protected by the Courts. 18 Because, the same may not be true in private
hospitals, it is important to know what is public and what is private. Foremost
among the decisions which have articulated the respective characteristics of
public and private hospitals is Levin v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore City .
15 Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n of St. Louis , 523 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir.
1975)
16 Id.
17 Schlein V. Milford Hospital, 423 F. Supp. 541, 543, n.l (D. Conn. 1976)
1 8 Peterson v. Tucson General Hospital Inc., 114 Ariz. 66 559 P. 2d 186 (1976)
citing
,
Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Board
,
398 F. 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968);
Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976)

A public corporation is an instrumentality of the state, founded
and owned by the state in the public interest, supported by public
funds and governed by managers deriving their authority from the
state. Public institutions such as state, county and city hospitals
and asylums are owned by the public and are devoted chiefly to
public purposes. On the other hand, a corporation organized by
permission of the legislature supported largely by voluntary
contributions and managed by officers and directors who are not
representatives of the state or any political subdivision is a private
corporation, although engaged in charitable work or performing
duties similar to that of a public corporation. 1 9
This distinction has been voiced in several jurisdictions, 20 most notably
by the District of Columbia which announced what now must be considered
the traditional rule in Shulman v. Washington Hospital Center . ** Shulman
confronted the controversy of a private hospital's refusal to renew a physician's
appointment to its courtesy staff. After discussing Levin's public/private
distinction, the District Court said
The overwhelming weight of authority, almost approaching unanimity,
is to the effect that [the power of a private hospital to appoint and
remove members of its medical staff at will] exists. ...The action
of hospital authorities in refusing to appoint a physician or surgeon
to its medical staff or declining to renew an appointment that has
expired or excluding any physician from practicing in the hospital
is not subject to judicial review. 22
The expressed rationale for the rule was a realization that judicial tribunals
are not equipped to review the action of hospital authorities in medical staff
decisions. While mindful of the fact that occasional injustice might result because
19 186 Md. 174, 46 A. 2d 198 (1946)
20 Edson v. Griffin Hospital , 21 Conn. Sup. 55, 144 A. 2d 341 (1958); West
Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (1953); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy
of Council Bluffs
,
243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W. 2d 701 (1952); Weary V. Baylor
Univ. Hosp
,
360 S.W. 2d 895 (1962)
21 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.C., D.C. 1963)
22 Id. at 63

of personality clashes or differences of opinion, the court concluded that the
courts were not in a position to substitute their judgment for that of professional
groups. 23 This reasoning does not explain, however, why the court felt that public
hospital staffing decisions are amenable to judicial scrutiny but private facility
decisions are not. One may suspect that the distinction rests in the belief that
the interests of society are best served when private organizations retain their
autonomy from governmental interference. 24
Many jurisdictions adopted Shulman's public/private distinction and its
limitations on judicial review. Some states, however, did not view this dichotomy
with favor. Through judicial expansion of the concept of state action,
development of the theory of quasi-public hospitals, evolution of common law
principles and legislative enactment, these jurisdictions reduced or eliminated
the importance of the public hospital-private hospital distinction.
The Concept of State Action
The statutory mechanism most often used to protect fourteenth amendment
rights from infringement by non-governmental action has been 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Under this provision
Every person who, under color of state or territorial statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage subjects any person within
the jurisdiction of the United States or causes any such person to
be subjected, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Federal Constitution or laws, is liable to the party. 25
^3 Id. at 64~ An exception in the Shulman decision allows judicial review where
there is an allegation that the hospital failed to abide by procedural rules
set forth in its constitution, bylaws or regulations. 222 F. Supp. at 64 .
Other jurisdictions have followed this lead. See
,
Clemons v. Fairview Medical
Center
,
449 So. 2d 788 (1984); Bricker v. Sceva Memorial Hosp., Ill N.H.
276; 281 A. 2d 589 (1971); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp.




25 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Critical to a successful application of § 1983 is the element of state action.
If state action, which is synonymous with "under color of state or territorial
statute, 26 js found to exist, then the decisions of a hospital will be subject to
the same constitutional controls as those of any governmental entity, and the
federal courts may review to ensure that due process has been provided. 27 If
no state action is involved, then no § 1983 remedy is available and other authority
must be found to support judicial review.
One common argument of physicians looking for review of negative
credentials actions taken by non-government hospitals was rooted in the Supreme
Court's Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority holding. 2 ** There, the court
said that a private institution's conduct was subject to the fourteenth amendment,
and thus § 1983, if the state so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the non-government entity that it had to be recognized
as a joint participant in the challenged activity. 29 Typically, a prima facie
case would be made by the plaintiff physician showing that the hospital received
federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act. 30 Physicians argued that by accepting
these funds and their attendant regulations, hospitals were transformed into
an arm of the state. To bolster claims of government assimilation, state and
2F Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr, Inc., 529 F 2d 638, 662 (4th Cir 1975)
27 Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm., 397 F 2d 33 (6th
Cir. 1968)
28 365 U.S. 715, 728 (1961)
29 Id. at 862
30 42 U.S.C. § 291, (Hill-Burton provides federal funds based upon a state
agencies' inventory of facilities to determine hospital construction needs
and priorities under federal standards. These agencies then adopt statewide
plans which are submitted to the Surgeon General of the United States
or his approval. In return, a benefitting hospital incurs an obligation to
treat indigent patients. Ward V. St. Anthony's Hospital, 476 F 2d 671, 674,
n.5 (10th Cir. 1973).
7a

federal tax exemptions, receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds, state licensure
and regulatory requirements and public land donations were cited. 31 This
approach enjoyed some success, especially in the Fourth Circuit. 32 However
the Supreme Court refined its state action analysis first in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.
3
3 and then in Blum v Yaretsky.3 4 in Jackson the court
focused its inquiry on whether a sufficiently close nexus existed between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter might fairly be said to be that of the state. State involvement without
state responsibility, the court said, cannot establish this nexus. 35
In Blum
,
to avoid possible fine and/or loss of medical funds, a private
nursing home transferred patients to lower levels of care in the face of
government contentions that it was failing to promptly discharge patients.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, pointed to three requirements for
a finding of state action: (1) a sufficiently close nexus between the state and
the conduct of the regulated private entity; (2) exercise of coercive power or
significant encouragement by the state which led the private entity to act in
the challenged matter; or (3) a private entity exercising powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. 36
31 Hodge v. Paoli Hospital, 576 F. 2d 563 (3rd in 1978); Lubin V. Crittendan
Hosp. Ass'n
,
713 F. 2d 414 (8th Cir. 1983); Briscoe V. Bock , 540 F. 2d 392
(8th Cir. 1976); Ward v. St. Anthony's Hospital , 476 F. 2d 671 (10th Cir.
1973)
32 Duffield v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr„ Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974);
Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp
., 313 F. Supp.301 (E. D. Pa. 1970)
33 419 U.S. 345 (1974)





Applying the test, the court found that the nursing home could not be said to
be acting at the behest of the government and there was no state action. As
the result of Jackson and Blum , it is now accepted in every circuit that receipt
of Hill-Burton funds, tax exempt status and similar government entanglement
will not be adequate to support a § 1983 action. 37
The most recent Fourth Circuit decision, Carter v. Norfolk Community
Hospital Association38 underscores the difficulty in obtaining a federal forum
on the state action theory. There, a physician alleged that his revocation of
clinical privileges was effected without due process. The Court of Appeals,
in denying his action, found no jurisdictional basis for the § 1983 action where
the hospital received Hill-Burton funds, Medicare and Medicaid funds, was subject
to state and federal regulations, was exempt from state and federal taxes and
received unspecified city support. A significant additional allegation was the
plaintiff's claim that the hospital revoked his privileges so as to appease a
Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO) whose negative report
might result in the hospital's disqualification for Medicare and Medicaid payments.
The facility's concern that the PSRO would terminate these funds was viewed
by the court as being indistinguishable from the nursing home's fears in Blum .
Without more specific and egregious conduct by the PSRO, the hospital could
not be considered to be acting for the state.
71 Monday v. Belton
,
739 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984); Schlein v. Milford Hosp.
Inc., 561 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir 1977); Hodge v. Paoli Mem. Hosp , 576 F.2d 563
(3d Cir. 1978); Modaber v. Culpeper Mem. Hosp., 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir.
1982); Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir) cert denied
423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp. Inc., 440 U.S.
971 (1979); Musso v. Suriname, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1978) cert, denied
440 U.S. 971 (1979); Lubin v. Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n
,
713 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1983); Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr , 520 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1975); Loh-Sen
Yo v. Cibda Gen. Hosp
., 706 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983)
38 761 F.ld 970 (4th Cir. 1985)

While, as a result of these cases, state action has had only limited success
in expanding judicial review of private hospital staffing actions, a somewhat
different approach to the public character of private hospitals has gained wider
support.
Quasi-Public Hospitals
In 1964, two New Jersey neurosurgeons formed a partnership and applied
for hospital privileges at a private, non-profit hospital. The first surgeon was
interviewed by the credentials committee, but after a twenty-five minute
meeting, the committee recommended that his application be denied. The second
surgeon was interviewed by the same committee two months later. When it
became clear to the committee that this second surgeon had no interest in
working in the hospital on a solo basis, without his partner, the committee
recommended that his application be denied. Each applicant was later told
that the reasons for denial were that the applicants were already on the staff
of two other hospitals; that they lived in another town; and that the hospital
already had four neurosurgeons on its staff. The applicants requested, but were
denied, a hearing. They later learned that the reasons given to them for denying
their applications were not true. In fact, the second applicant would have been
recommended for admission to the staff had not his request for membership
been bracketed with his partner. The reason for denying the first surgeon's
application was because the committee had received a reference which raised
questions about his personality. 39
As a result of facts such as these, some jurisdictions began to look more
closely at the role and function of hospitals and the traditional public-private
facility distinction.
6y Sussman v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n
,
92 N.J. Super. 163, 222 A. 2d 530 (1966)
10

In Shulman , 40 the District Court for the District of Columbia had concluded
that the mere fact that a hospital is operated for the benefit of the public and
not for profit does not destroy its character as a private institution. A private
hospital is not a public utility, the court said. "Neither is the operation of the
hospital a public calling such as that of a common carrier, light or power
companies or a telephone company."^! In so holding, the court placed itself
squarely at philosophical odds with the New Jersey Supreme Court which earlier
in 1963 decided Greisman v Newcomb Hospital4 2 and formed the primary basis




the court confronted the validity of a hospital bylaw which
had the effect of excluding osteopathic physicians from the medical staff.
The plaintiff, an osteopath, had an unrestricted license from the state of New
Jersey and practiced in Vineland, a small town served only by Newcomb Hospital.
The hospital was a non-profit corporation which solicited and received charitable
contributions and had recently completed additional construction which was
funded almost entirely by public subscriptions. Relying on the same authority
cited in Shulman
,
the hospital sought to avoid judicial intervention into its staffing
policy on the grounds that it was a private hospital. Although agreeing that
the hospital was a non-profit organization, the New Jersey court was struck
by the fact that the hospital constituted a virtual monopoly in its geographic
area. It also discussed the judicial scrutiny imposed on other private businesses
and professionals which served the common good such as innkeepers, carriers
4U Shulman
, at p. 62
41 Id.
42 40 NJ 389, 192 A, 2d 817 (1963)
11

and farriers. Hospitals, too, were being operated, not for private ends, but
for public benefit, the court concluded. Therefore, the hospital's powers,
particularly those relating to the selection of staff members, must be considered
powers held in trust. Thus, courts would be remiss if they did not intervene
where those powers were invoked for a reason unrelated to sound hospital
standards. 4 ^ The Grieisman court drew heavily upon its previous holding in
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society44 in formulating its position.
Falcone had held that a voluntary medical society, with a de facto monopoly
over appointments to local hospital staffs, so affected economic rights of
physicians in the area that it assumed a quasi-public function and judicial review
of its rejection of a membership application was proper. 45
The importance of monopoly position and economic deprivation in
reviewability cases has varied in subsequent applications. In 1967 the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, heard the case of Sussman v. Overlook
Hospital Association 4 *^ in which two surgeons were denied hospital privileges
without a hearing and brought an action to compel their appointment. The
Chancery (trial court) Division entered extensive findings of fact in its decision
ordering the hospital to formulate procedures to ensure fair review of the
plaintiff's application. Implicit or explicit in those findings were conclusions
that the hospital was a private (non-government) facility, that the reason for
denying the clinician's application stemmed from a personality clash, that
Overlook Hospital exercised no monopoly power (other hospitals served the
q6 16 at 825
44 34 N.J. 582, 170 A. 2d 791 (1961)
45 2D at 800
46 95 N.J. Sup. 418, 231 A. 2d 389 (1967)
12

area) and there was no economic deprivation to the plaintiffs (each enjoyed
an otherwise successful practice). 47 Despite the significant deviation from
Griesman's factual context, the Appellate Division affirmed the Chancery Court's
decision. It agreed that Overlook Hospital's Board of Trustees owed a duty
to the surgeons and to the public, to conduct more substantial inquiry into the
applications for appointment.
Two years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court again heard a controversy
involving the staffing decision of a private hospital, ordering that extensive
due process rights be afforded a physician denied privileges. The court in Garrow





non-profit hospital serving the public generally is a quasi-public institution,
which has a fiduciary relationship with the public arising out of its public trust. 49
Nowhere in the discussion of facts or law does the court mention monopolistic
position or economic deprivation as prerequisites to judicial intervention.
As other jurisdictions critically examined the traditional non-intervention
doctrine, the Greisman decision was repeatedly referenced as authority for
an alternate approach. Most courts electing to follow its principles adhered
to the formulated analysis of quasi-public institutions and looked for monopolistic
positions or economic harm to plaintiffs before permitting judicial review.
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii and Washington have taken this stance. ^0 Other
47 Sussman v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n
,
92 N.J. Super 163, 222 A. 2d 530 (1966)
48 79 N.J. Sup. 418, 231 A. 2d 53 (1979)
49 Wat 537
50 Starrs v. Lutheran Hospital and Homes Society of America
,
661 P. 2d 632
(Alas 1983); Patterson v. Tucson General Hosp. Inc., 559 P. 2d 186 (Ariz.
App 1976); Silver V. Castle Memorial Hosp
,
497 P. 2d 564 (Haw. 1972); Rao
v. Auburn General Hosp
,
517 P. 2d 240 (Wash. App. 1973)
13

jurisdictions have not concerned themselves with specific indicia of the
quasi-public nature of an otherwise private facility. They have taken the position
that a court may exercise its jurisdiction whenever a physician's staff privileges
have been adversely affected by a private hospital operated to serve the general
public. Colorado, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire and Vermont have steered
this course. 5 * New Mexico has recently joined the list of jurisdictions which
permit review on a quasi-public theory. In an interesting application of Greisman
,
New Mexico's Supreme Court took the position that since so much of its territory
was rural and sparsely served by hospitals, the monopolistic conditions described
in Griesman were so prevalent, that permitting review of private hospitals within
the jurisdicton was patently consistent with the philosophy and objectives expressed
in that case. 52
Further inroads into the traditional rule, based on quasi-public analysis,
appear imminent. Several states which previously embraced Shulman have
reconsidered the issue and while not making a clean break from the Shulman
philosophy, sufficient ambiguity exists to question the continued viability of
the doctrine in the jurisdiction. Kentucky and Indiana each have decisions which
appear to have opened the courtroom door a little bit wider. 53 While the signals
and inconsistencies are not so strong, courts in Kansas, Minnesota, Oregon,
51 Hawkins v Kinsie
.
540 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1975); Lloyd v. Jefferson Davis Mem.
Hosp
,
345 S.2d 104C (Miss. 1977); North Valley Hosp Inc v. Kauffman , 544
P.2d 1219 (Mont. 1976) Woodard v Porter Hosp Inc. 217 A. 2d 37 Vt. 1966);
Bricker v. Sceva Speare Mem. Hosp., 281 A. 2d 589 (N.H. 1971)
52 Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp
,
692 P. 2d 1350
53 McElhinney v William Booth Mem. Hosp
., 544 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1976); cf.,Hughes
v Good Samaritan Hosp
,
158 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1942); Kennedy v. St. Joseph
Memorial Hosp
,
482 N.E.2d 268 (Ind. 1985) ct, Yarnell v. Sisters of St. Francis
Health Services, 446 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 2983)
14

Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have also provided hints of a ohange.
It is important to realize that the quasi-public label has been applied thus
far only to private non-profit hospitals. Examining Greisman and the decisions
whioh have followed, it does no, appear that the quasi-public analysis can be
consistently applied to private, for profit facilities. It would seem that those
institutions would be unaffected by this line of authority.
Evolution of Common Law : "Fair Procedure" in California
One year before the Greisman decision in New Jersey, the California Supreme
Court recognized the danger of insulating private hospital action from judicial
review. Expanding on its ,959 decision in Wyatt v Tahoe Forest Hosoita, n..fw54
(recognizing physician due process rights in public hospital staffing actions),
.he court rejected the suggestion that private hospitals must have absolute
discretion to exclude doctors from their staffs in order to maintain professional
standards and high quality medical care.55 In 1989> the com, considered^^
v Pacific Coast Society of 0rthodnntiPS 56 an appeal by an^^ ^
had been denied membership in a professional society. While noting that the
association was not an economic necessity, the court concluded that it still wielded
monopoly power over the practice of orthodontics and affected significant
economic and professional concerns. Thus it was clothed with a public interest
and individuals had a judicially enforceable right to have their applications
considered in a manner comporting with due process principles.
M
174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959)
55
myt^§dMrml^Jl2s^^' 5s caLM 8 °6 - *> cai. RPt,
56
1 Cal.3d 160, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495 (1969)
15

A second Pinsker v Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontics 5 ? followed
with the California Supreme Court declaring that it recognized a common law
right of individuals to pursue a lawful occupation free from intentional
interference, either by unlawful means or by means otherwise lawful but without
sufficient justification. A private association, the court said, must refrain
from arbitrary action. Rather, its action must be both substantively rational
and procedurally fair. 5 ° The court explained that this right of fair procedure
could be satisfied by any one of a variety of procedures which would afford
the physician a fair opportunity to present a position, including adequate notice
of charges and a reasonable opportunity to respond. 59
One year later, a San Francisco physician petitioned a court to compel
a private hospital to consider his application for privileges. The Court of Appeals,
drawing upon the preceding authority, ruled that regardless of monopolistic
position or economic deprivation, private hospital staff privilege decisions are
subject to review using the fair procedure criteria. 60
Legislated Review
One final category of jurisdictions which have wrested themselves free
of the traditional Shulman philosophy is comprised of those states which have
enacted statutes governing review of medical staff decisions. New York's
57 12 Cal. 3d 541, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 526 P. 2d 253 (1974) citing Guillary v
Godfrey, 134 Cal. App.2d 628, 286 P 2d 474 (1955)
58 jd. at 252 (to avoid confusion between this common law righi and
constitutionally imposed rights, the Pinsker court says that it would refrain
from using due process language and would instead refer to a requirement
of fair procedure. 116 Cal. Rptr. at 251 note 7)
59 Id.at 255
60 Ascherman v St. Francis Mem. Hosp
,




legislation, for example, provides that it is improper for the governing body
of a hospital to refuse to act on an application or to deny or expel a physician
from staff membership without giving reasons. A physician who feels aggrieved
may file a complaint with the state public health counsel and thereby initiate
an investigation into the action taken. 61 This provision was designed and intended
to protect the rights of physicians in privately or publicly owned facilities and
to provide them some degree of due process. 62 Injunctive relief may also be
available. 63
The Virginia Health Code declares it to be an improper practice for the
governing body of a hospital with 25 beds or more and which is required by state
law to be licensed, to fail to act on an application, deny staff membership or
to exclude, expel, curtail or terminate a physician's hospital privileges without
stating the reasons therefore. Further, it is an improper practice if the adverse
action is based on reasons unrelated to standards of patient care, patient welfare
or other specified legitimate considerations. This provision enables an aggrieved
physician, in addition to other available remedies, to seek an injunction prohibiting
further violation of the section. 64
The Florida legislature is even more protective of physician rights. The
Hospital Licensing and Regulation Code stipulates that a licensed facility, having
reasonable belief that a physician has engaged in conduct which constitutes
grounds for discipline (as outlined in the statute) may suspend, deny, revoke
or curtail the physician's ^taff privileges provided its procedures comply with
bl N.Y. Public HealthTaw
,
§ 2801-b (McKinney 1985)
62 Fried v Straussman
,
82 Misc 2d 121, 369 N.Y. S 2d 591 (1975)
63 N.Y. Public Health Law
,
§ 2801-C (McKinney 1985)
64 Va. Health Code, § 32.1-134.1 (1979)
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the standards outlined by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals,
the American Osteopathic Association, the Accreditation Association for
Ambulatory Health Care and the Medicare/Medicaid Conditions of
Participation.65 This statutory intersection with professional association fair
hearing guidelines introduces some of the extrajudicial pressures on facilities
to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Potentially, the Medicare Conditions of Participation 66 which have
significant economic impact on health care facilities, could dictate due process
policy. To date, however, federal regulations on the subject have confined
themselves to broad, general statements of policy regarding staff qualification
and appointments. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals also
wields potentially significant economic power over health care facilities through
its inspection and accreditation function and may directly impact on facility
prestige and medical training program participation. In its Accreditation Manual,
the Commission's Medical Staff standard requires that the medical staff adopt
bylaws providing for the establishment of a fair hearing and appellate review
mechanism for providers involved in adverse actions. These mechanisms must
specify matters such as right to introduce witnesses or evidence, the role, if
any, of legal counsel and the period of time beyond which the right to request
a hearing is waived. 67 As noted earlier, even those jurisdictions which follow
the traditional Shulman rule will review a private facility's action where it
is alleged that the hospital failed to comply with its own bylaws or regulations.
00 Fla Stat. Ann § 395.0115 (1985)
66 42 C.F.R. § 405.1023 (1985)
67 Accreditation Manual for Hospitals
,
Joint Commission for Accreditation
of Hospitals (1985 edition)
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Thus, in order to protect its position in the profesional community, a hospital
may adopt bylaws or regulations establishing notice and hearing rights. They
will then have their staffing decisions subject to judicial review, at least on
the issue of whether they complied with those bylaws and regulations.
Scope and Standard of Review
Simply having a right to judicial review of credentials action will not
guarantee adequate protection of physician rights in all situations. If the scope
of review is too narrow or if the standards of review are not stringent, the
physician may not have the opportunity to contest important issues.
When a physician is claiming that the procedure used by the hospital
was not fair, the standard of review would seem clear. Since the court is
rendering a decision on an issue of law which the hospital did not decide, it
is a forum of first impression. 68 The issue then becomes: what process is
due? This question is answered by examining whether the facility is public,
so that constitutional due process principles control, or, whether it is private.
If it is private and the jurisdiction follows the traditional, Shulman approach,
the court will only look to see whether the hospital has followed its own bylaws,
rules and regulations. If the jurisdiction has adopted a quasi-public approach,
then the due process rights may be quite extensive, as in New Jersey where
prehearing discovery rights and right to counsel at hearings have been
recognized. 69 California, in its case law, has outlined its fair procedure
"° Note : Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges: Hearing and Judicial Review,
56 Iowa L. Rev. 1356 (1971)
69 Garrow v Elizabeth Gen Hosp. and Dispensary
,




requirements, 7 ^ and those states which have legislated review will have
their standards. 7 *
A physician might also dispute the basis for a hospital's adverse
credentials action. Now the question becomes one of whether the court
will actively scrutinize the underlying reason and evidence supporting the
action or whether it will merely review for abuse of discretion? In many
jurisdictions, only a limited review is permitted, generally confined to an
examination of whether the hospitals actions were arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable. 72 In these courts, the inquiry focuses on whether the stated
reason for the action is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
reason bears some relation to the legitimate interests of the hospital. Patient
care would obviously be such an interest. Failure to carry required
malpractice insurance, 7 ** and creating a disruptive environment in the
hospital74 have been upheld as valid reasons for action. On the other hand
failure to meet a hospital bylaw's requirement of membership in a county
medical society and graduation from a medical school recognized by the
American Medical Association was not a valid basis for denying an application
for staff membership in New Jersey. 75 Other jurisdictions may offer
extensive review. In California, a qualified physician's right to use a
70 See e.g , Anton v San Antonio Community Hosp ., 19 Cal. 3d 814, 140
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,
517 P. 2d 240; and Woodard , 217 A.2d 37
73 Kelly
,
692 P. 2d 1350
74 Bricker
,
281 A. 2d 589
75 Greisman, 192 A. 2d 817
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hospital is considered to be a fundamental interest. 76 In reviewing an action
which affects such an interest, a court will exercise its independent judgment.
It will examine the action taken and the factual basis for the action. If it
concludes that the sanction is not supported by the weight of evidence, it must
find an abuse of discretion. 77 Therefore, California's courts may substitute
their own judgment for that of the hospital.
Conclusion
A physician's right to judicial review of adverse credentials action is not
absolute, but it is pervasive. Public hospitals, including those few which may
be so defined because of significant state action, must provide a constitutional
measure of due process when affecting constitutional property or liberty interests.
The federal courts may be used to ensure compliance. Private hospitals, in
jurisdictions which have adopted a quasi-public theory, must provide process
which can meet the standard and scope of review within their jurisdiction.
California facilities must measure up to the specifications of the right to "fair
procedure." Those states which have legislated a process of credentials action
and review will require that their facilities comport with the statutory standards.
And finally, because of professional pressures, even those private facilities
which might otherwise not be subject to review, might be compelled to impose
regulations and bylaws controlling actions and thus open themselves to oversight
by the courts.
Even if there were no legal requirements or judicial review, objectives
and methods of medical quality assurance and the inherent nature of the practice
76 Anton
,
567 P. 2d 1162 (in determining whether a right is fundamental, economic
aspects are not the sole criteria. The importance of the right to the individual




of medicine would require a fair hearing process. Seldom in the application
of the art and science of medicine is a physician's action both clearly inexcusable
and absolutely unpardonable. Extenuating and mitigating circumstances will
abound. The active participation of objective physicians to review errors and
foibles is critical. If reputations and livelihoods are destroyed by a system
which operates on an ex-parte basis, regardless of the good faith of hospital
boards, it won't be long before clinicians will be loath to participate lest they
perpetuate a process which may some day trample them.
Thus fair hearings are necessary in all cases where adverse credentials
action is contemplated. Whether the compelling factor is awareness that a
decision will be subject to judicial review, or that a fair hearing plan is required
by accrediting bodies, or is founded on the knowledge that an effective quality
assurance program needs such hearings, the ultimate objective is the same:
to balance the public's right to the best possible care with the interests of
physicians in pursuing their profession free from unwarranted intrusion. Having
reached that conclusion, the next question is: What is required for a fair hearing?
II. FAIR HEARING PLAN GUIDELINES
The Supreme Court's less than definitive guidance on how to determine
how much process is due is yet another three-part test. This approach announced
in Mathews v Eldridge 78 requires examination of: (1) the individual interest
affected; (2) the risks of erroneous deprivation of that interest through use
of the selected procedure, and (3) the burden on the government (or in our
context, the hospital) if more extensive procedures were used. Under these
Vs 424 U.S. 319 (1975)
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criteria, acceptable procedure will depend on the particular circumstances
of the parties. ?9
Applying Mathews to credentials cases, the hospital's interests in
maintaining quality control while avoiding a protracted proceeding which ties
up its health care resources is balanced against the physician's interests in
continuing a professional practice in the facility. Counterweights to each side
are provided by the public's interest in the hospital's quality control, the public's
interest in seeing that the hospital's services remain available to those in need 8 ^
and the public's interest in having the physician of choice provide treatment
in the facility of choice. Examining these interests and the conclusions courts
have reached in evaluating credentials controversies can lead to certain basic
principles of fair and objective process. The following recommendations are
offered as guidelines for designing such a process. Because of factual and to
some extent jurisdictional variations, they cannot be considered minimum
standards or mandatory requirements. They do however, provide a framework
from which to construct a fair hearing plan.
Guideline 1; Medical staff bylaws must put physicians on notice of required
qualifications, performance and behavior.
Broad discretion is given to hospitals in setting medical staff standards.
The widely quoted judicial philosophy is
No court should substitute its evaluation of such matters for that
of the Hospital Board. It is the Board, not the court, which is charged
with the responsibility of providing a competent staff of doctors. ..The
court is charged with the narrow responsibility of assuring that
the qualifications imposed by the Board are reasonably related
to the operation of the hospital and fairly administered. 81
Ya Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v McElroy
,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1975)
80 Silver
,
497 P. 2d 564
81 Sosa v Bd of Mgrs. of Val Verde Mem. Hosp
,




Nonetheless, exclusion from a hospital cannot rest upon a decision or rule
which is sutftantively capricious or contrary to public policy. 8 ^ it must reasonably
relate to furthering the health care mission of the hospital. 83
Detailed descriptions of prohibited conduct are not required and are
probably not desirable given the rapidly shifting standards of medical care.** 4
While courts have differed as to how general a standard may be before it is
impermissibly vague, recent cases have followed the thinking that bylaws cannot
be minutely codified and great latitude must be given to hospitals to prescribe
their staff qualifications. 85 Some definite guidelines are appropriate, however.
Disqualification on grounds of incompetence, drug or intoxicant abuse, mental
or physical impairment which may adversely affect patient care, a finding
of liability by a court of competent jurisdiction for medical negligence or
malpractice involving negligent conduct and failure to comply with the policies,
procedures or directives of the risk management program or any quality




One bylaw provision which has seen more than its share of litigation
is that which requires a provider to refrain from disruptive conduct in the
hospital. Contrary to what may be popular belief, such regulations, if (and
this is an important if) constructed in terms of protecting patients and
82 Pinsker
,
526 P. 2d 253
83 Berryman v Valley Hospital
,
196 N.J. Super. 359, 482 A. 2d 944 (1984)
84 North Broward Hospital District v Mizell, 148 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962)
85 See
, e.g. Sosa , 437 F. 2d 173
86 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0115 (1985)
24

maintaining quality of care, have been overwhelmingly accepted by the courts.** 7
The reasoning has been that a hospital has an interest in making sure that
the physicians on staff possess the ability to work well with other staff
members. 88 For example, staff conferences to review the work done in the
hospital may supplement individual consultation and advice and the valuable
experience gained from hospital practice. Thus, considerations of team spirit
and cooperativeness can be as important as technical skills. 89 On the other
hand, there is the danger that action based on personality, temperamental
suitability and propensity to disrupt staff harmony is so ambiguous that it
might be used as a subterfuge to mask factors having no relevancy to the issue
of fitness for staff membership. 90 In addition, there may be a distinction
between the ability to work with others and the ability to get along with others.
The California Supreme Court addressed the difference in Miller v Eisenhower
Medical Center91 saying that the ability to work with others focuses on the
ability to cooperate in the performance of hospital functions while a previously
invalidated bylaw requiring staff to "get along with others"92 focused on general
compatibiity. Although accepting the "ability to work with" requirement,
the court required that adverse action based on such a bylaw be predicated
°* Sussman
,
222 A72d 530; Anderson v. Bd of Trustees of Caro Community
Hosp. Inc., 159 N.W. 2d 347 (Mich. App. 1968); Peterson , 559 P. 2d 186;
Gilbert v Johnson
,
419 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Bricker , 281 A. 2d
589; Rao, 573 P. 2d 834
88 See
,
McMillan v Anchorage Community Hosp
., 646 R 2d 857 (Ala 198?)
89 Note: Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation
,
17 Stanford
L. Rev. 900 (1965)
90 Sussman
,
222 A. 2d 530
91 Miller v Eisenhower Medical Ctr., 27 Cal. 3d 614, 166 Col. Rptr 826, 614
P. 2d 258




on a showing that the applicant's inability to work with others would present
a real and substantial danger to patient care. 93 other jurisdictions share this
concern. 94 To be reasonably secure therefore, this type of bylaw should (1) require
a connection between the disruptive conduct and patient care; and (2) the record
should clearly and persuasively indicate that the disharmony which led to the
credentials actions probably would or did have an effect on patient care and
was not merely annoying to other staff and administrators.
Guideline 2 ; A physician must be given adequate notice of the hearing and a
statement of reasons for the adverse action.
While the requirements of due process are flexible, a physician is entitled
to reasonable notice of the charges and a fair opportunity to be heard with respect
to those charges. 95 Conducting a hearing without adequate notice and a statement
of reasons is not only tantamount to no hearing at all but undermines objective
fact finding. The physician must be prepared to meet the charges and counter
with available, meaningful information. The hearing body must have a firm grasp
of what the focus of inquiry is so that it may channel its efforts toward resolving
those specific matters. Collateral problems or trouble spots, which might
adversely affect the quality of care at the hospital, may be identified. In balancing
the respective interests of the physician and the facility both sides are benefitted
by ensuring that the qualifications or behavior at issue are well defined.
The maximum length of time required for a physician to prepare for the
hearing will vary according to the complexity of the allegations. There
93 Miller
,
166 Cal. Rptr. at 835
94 Sussman
,





496 F. 2d 174; Klinge , 523 F.2d 51; Anton , 567 P.2d 1162
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is no reason "or the bylaws not to establish a period during which the hearing
must convene, for example, seven to ten days after delivery of charges and
notice to the clinician. When the hearing convenes, if the physician claims
not to have been able to prepare adequately, the hearing committee may (within
its discretion) continue the matter for a reasonable period. It is important
that this discretionary authority be discussed and guidance for its exercise
included in the medical staff bylaws.
The statement setting forth the basis of the action need not be absolutely
specific. There is a danger in being too precise, with the result that the
committee will lack the flexibility to look into all issues which may be raised
during the hearing. If the committee goes too far astray from the noticed
basis of action, it leaves the physician unprepared to meet the allegations
and renders any adverse decision vulnerable to attack as being arbitrary. 9 ^
Where specific patient cases are involved and will be discussed, reference
to the cases should be made. 97 The same is true when specific incidents are
known which call into question the physician's qualifications. Under most
circumstances it will be sufficient to use specific cases and incidents of which
the physician is given notice to support general grounds for discipline such
as lack of surgical judgment, lack of adequate training and background etc.
One announced test is whether the nature of the fault, though generally
expressed, should be understood by one with the professional training and
background of the subject physician. 9 **
Discovery may be important to the question of whether adequate notice
has been given. Fundamental fairness requires that the physician have access
^ b Christhilf
,
496 F. 2d~174; Bock v John C. Lincoln Hosp., 145 Ariz. 432, 702
P. 2d 253 )1985)
97 Woodbury
,




to the evidence." If specific patient cases are to be the topics of discussion
then it is necesary for the clinician to have the opportunity to review those
records. The doctor must be afforded the opportunity to defend by contesting
the merits of each charge or incident. 1 00 n [s no t required that the physician
be given access to the entire file of the investigatory body but there should
be access to those matters which are necessary to alert him or her to the issues
to be addressed. 1"1 if, during the course of the hearing, it becomes necessary
to inquire into documents or information not previously provided, then that
material can be disclosed and an opportunity given to the physician to examine
and prepare a response.
Administrators often are concerned that disclosure of some information
which has been received will impede the ability to investigate a doctor's
temperament and competence. Courts, however, may be inclined to view
the deleterious effect that nondisclosure has on the physician as outweighing
the interests of confidentiality.^2 in certain circumstances the solution may
be to give the information but not the source. This will suffice where it is
the substance of the information which is material but the source is irrelevant.
For example, a staff doctor might criticize the surgical technique of a colleague,
thus raising the issue, but the hearing body judges the technique relying on













methodology. !03 Several states have codified confidentiality concerns !04
and/or recognized a right of qualified privilege for witnesses in credentials
cases. 1 05 jn any event, it is unlikely that a facility will be able to take final
adverse action against a physician while withholding important information.
This is true even when the hospital maintains that nondisclosure is important
to its peer review function.
Guideline 3: It is the duty of the hospital to provide a fair, objective hearing
body.
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. 1 06
This principle applies to administrative decisions which must comply with
due process requirements. 1 07 The objective is to have a panel that does not
harbor a state of mind which would preclude a fair hearing. 1 08
As a starting point, it may be easiest to discuss what the concept of
impartiality does not require. It does not require that the subject physician
be allowed to participate in the selection of the hearing committee members. 1 09
Nor does it require that the individuals on the hearing panel be completely
TTTT Id.
104 See e.g., N.Y. Education Law
,
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1986) (physician not given reasonable opportunity to inquire into credentials




Smith v Vallejo General Hosp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 453, 216 Cal.Rptr.
189 (1985) and Anton, 567 P.2d 1162
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unfamiliar with the physician or the underlying facts. 1 10 Disqualification
should occur when a panel member has an actual bias in the matter.
Disqualification is also appropriate when "a situation exists under which human
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable."HI Therefore, partiality problems should be
examined from two perspectives, individual and institutional.
From the individual vantage point, hearing committee members should be
disqualified if they have a prejudgment concerning issues of fact about the
case or if they have some partiality which evidences bias or personal
prejudice.H 2 An established position or belief on issues of policy (e.g. physicians
who have abuse controlled substances should have privileges revoked regardless
of successful rehabilitation efforts) need not be disqualified.! 1 3 Members
who stand to gain or lose some interest as a result of the decision should be
disqualified.H4 por example, the medical staff of any hospital has a pecuniary
interest in the number of doctors on the staff. However, bad motive is not
to be presumed. 11 "*
Involvement in the preliminary procedures required to bring the case to
a hearing is not necessarily equivalent to unacceptable bias or familiarity.
Thus where one member of a credentials committee assisted the hospital
1X0 Withrow v Larkin
,
421 U.S. 35 (1975); Ritter v Bd of Commissioners of
Adams County
,
637 P 2d 940 (Wash. 1981); Suckle v Madison General
Hosp., 499 F 2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1974) (hearing offered to plaintiff before
hospital's entire active medical staff was not inherently deficient)
111 Laska
,
225 Cal Rptr at 608
112 See, e.g., Withrow
,
42 1 U.S. 35
113 w.
H4 Id.
115 Richards v Emanual County Hosp. Auth., 603 F. Supp 84 (S.D. Ga. 1984)
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attorney who was drafting charges by interpreting for him a memo received
from the Director of Nurses, disqualifying activity was not found to exist. 116
In order to establish partiality or other disqualifying factor, the clinician
should be provided an opportunity to question committee members. 117 This
questioning should be strictly limited, under procedures prescribed in the bylaws
to issues of bias. The physician need not be given the opportunity to "try the
judges" by questioning their professional performance or their compliance
with bylaws unless it directly impacts on the question of impartiality. 118
Institutional impartiality raises more difficult questions. Here the issue
is whether the facility taints its committee members because of the way it
has structured its credentials review process. Before a decision can be made
in a credentials case, an investigation into the allegations must usually be
conducted. When the investigation is carried out by one body, such as, the
credentials committee, and its recommendation forwarded for a hearing and
decision by a separate body, such as the Executive Committee of the Medical
Staff, then, provided there is no overlapping of membership, there is no
institutional partiality. Many times, however, the investigative body and hearing
body are the same or there is an overlap of membership. How does the law
view this arrangement? The answer seems to be that there is one rule for
California and one rule for everyone else. Taking the latter first, the Supreme
Court of the United States has written that "the incredible variety of
administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing
prniciple."119 Therefore, "it is not surprising to find that the case law, both
federal and state, rejects the idea that the combination of judging and
1X6 Ladenheim v Union County Hosp. District
,
31 111. Dec 568, 76 111. App




118 Woodbury . 447 F.2d 839
119 Withrow, 421 U.S. at 1467

federal and state, rejects the idea that the combination of judging and
investigative functions is a denial of due process."120 Any contention that
the combination of these functions has created an unconstitutional risk of
bias in administrative adjudications has a difficult burden of persuasion and
must overcome a presumption of the honesty of adjudicators. 1 21 An example
of the application of this philosophy might be helpful.
In Duffield v Charleston Area Medical Center
,
122 the Fourth Circuit
was hearing the appeal of a surgeon whose privileges had been revoked.
Procedurally, the chairman of the hospital's surgery department had
recommended to the Board of Governors that the revocation take place. The
Board reviewed, accepted and adopted the recommendation, subject to the
surgeon's right to a hearing before a Joint Conference Committee on which
several Board members also sat. It was the position of the surgeon that the
members of the governing board who sat on the Joint Conference Committee
had, by their action of accepting and adopting the recommendation of the
Department of Surgery, made a prejudgment of the case and therefore were
disqualified to sit or vote on the Joint Conference Committee. In rejecting
this argument the court reviewed established case law concluding that (in
the judicial context) the bias and familiarity which serves as a disqualifier
must stem from an extrajudicial source. In other words, the opinion on the
merits was developed on some basis other than what was learned from direct
paticipation. 123 Noting that application of this rule extended to administrative
1ZU Id., citing 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1302 (1951)
121 Withrow
,
421 U.S. at 1464
122 Duffield
,
503 F. 2d 512
123 U.S. v Grinell Co., 384 U.S. 563, 568 (196 )
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bodies, 1 24 the court concluded that the situation in which the members of
the board and Joint Conference Committee found themselves was analagous
to a judge issuing a show cause order in connection with an application for
preliminary injunction. Thus, absent a showing of actual bias, disqualification
was not required. 1 25
At least one court has applied a "Rule of Necessity" to situations where
institutional bias is at issue. 1 26 Application of the rule begins with the premise
that due process in hospital cases dictates that physician problems be resolved
with a minimum of procedural complications due to the hospital's interest
in patient safety. 1 27 It then continues: "Because only the hospital board has
the power to revoke hospital privileges, the policy favoring an unprejudiced
tribunal must yield to allow action by the only body empowered to act in the
matter...Disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the openly tribunal
with power in the premises. 1 28 if this approach seems to overly patronize
the hospital's interest, California has shown leanings the other way.
In its Anton v San Antonio Community Hospital 129 decision the California
Supreme Court took a liberal but not radical stand on the question of impartiality
when it ruled that minimal due process required a fair hearing by a committee
lz4 NLRB v Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219 (1947)
12 5 Duffield
,
503 F. 2d at 519
1 26 Leonard v Board of Directors, Prowers City Hosp. District, 673 P. 2d
1019, (Colo. App. 1983)
12 7 fa., citing , Board of MEdical Examiners v Steward , 203 Md. 574, 102
A.2d 148 (1954) and Schwab v Ariyoshi, 57 Haw. 348, 555 P. 2d 1329 (1976)
12 8 Duffield
,
503 F. 2d at 519, citing
,
Stretton v Wadsworth Veterans Hosp.,
537 F 2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976)
129 Anton, 567 P. 2d 1162
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whose members were not previously involved in the proceeding. Subsequent
to Anton, a case was decided by the California Court of Appeals which was
expected to send a "reverberating shock wave throughout the entire medical
community.
"
13 while such a shake-up has so far failed to materialize,
Applebaum v Board of Directors of Barton Memorial Hospital 1 ^ 1 has created
uncertainty and some apprehension among hospital administrators. Because
of its potential, a detailed discussion of the case follows.
In 1977, Dr. Furman, one of two board certified obstetricians on the
staff of Barton Memorial Hospital, a South Lake Tahoe facility, wrote to the
hospital's chief of staff transmitting nursing complaints about Dr. Applebaum's
delivery techniques and requesting an investigation pursuant to the hospital's
bylaws. Applebaum, a board certified family practitioner, had practiced at
the hospital for three years. Dr. Furman included in his letter allegations
of incompetence in the performance of deliveries and care of the newborn,
unauthorized use of experimental drugs, falsification of medical records and
other improprieties. Dr. Furman and the other board certified obstetrician
were members of the hospital executive committee which met and appointed
an ad hoc committee consisting of six physicians, including the two obstetricians
and two pediatricians to investigate the charges. This committee considered
Dr. Furman's letter and letters from the nurses who originally brought the
matter to light and discussed several patient records. After deliberating,
the ad hoc committee recommended to the executive committee thai: Dr.
Applebaum's obstetrical privileges be suspended. The executive committee
*f Silverman, Case Comment, Applebaum v Board of Directors of Barton
Memorial Hospital, Hospital Privileges Proceedings—the Law is Clear.
If only it were Applied in Applebaum
,
L.A. Daily J., Jul 11, 1980.
131 104 Cal App 3d 653, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980)
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acted favorably on this recommendation prompting Dr. Applebaum to request
review by the medical staff appeals committee. This committee was comprised
of three physicians who had not previously been involved in the dispute. After
considering the available information the appeals committee agreed that Dr.
Applebaum's privileges be suspended. 1 ^ 2
These facts, if considered under the principles thus far discussed, would
not seem to require that the hospital's decision be overturned. In fact, this
may be an easy case under those precepts since ultimately there was no overlap
of investigatory and final adjudicatory function and none of the members of
the appeals committee had previous involvement in the case. (Two of the
appeals committee members had been appointed to the executive committee
after it had reached its decision but other than having heard some unspecified
disparaging remarks, there was nothing to connect these physicians with Dr.
Applebaum's case. Hearing such remarks would seem clearly to fall within
the rule that general awareness of the subject is not a disqualifier).
The California Court of Appeals did not view the facts that way however.
Quoting from the opinion
The distinction between fair procedure and due process rights appears
to be one of origin and not of the extent of protection afforded
an individual. .-Biased decision makers are constitutionally
impermissible and even the probability of unfairness is to be
avoided. ..The question before us is whether this situation, completely
apart from any question of actual bias on the part of any of the
physicians involved and from the merits of the charges, presents
a violation of fair procedure rights to an impartial tribunal by virtue
of a practical probability of unfairness. We hold it does. As a
practical matter ai.d without in any way impugning their good faith,
the general practitioner and pediatric specialist members of the
ad hoc committee were in an extremely difficult position. The
charges were brought by one of the two specialists on whom they
were accustomed and, indeed required to rely for obstetrical
expertise and with whom they were in frequent and intimate
professional contact. His associate supported the charges and
the committee was thus presented with a solid front of the only
ITT Id at 836
35

special expertise available to it. To presume impartiality of the
ad hoc committee in such circumstances goes beyond what can
reasonably be expected of human beings in this professional
setting...We recognize that the ad hoc committee's function. ..was
nominally investigatory not adjudicative. Nevertheless, the chances
of a contradictory conclusion by another body within the hospital
were virtually nil. * 33
Does this decision mean, as has been commented, that it is necessary
to have medical staffs of sufficient size so that at each stage of an evaluation
there will be no prior involvement of reviewing physicians and preferably no
prior knowledge of the individual under investigation?^ 4 Since that is an
untenable result, one is left with no conclusion other than, as subsequent
decisions indicate, 135 Applebaum doesn't mean what it seems to say and despite
the fact that the California Supreme Court refused to consider Applebaum
,
Anton continues as the law in California. The situation certainly bears further
watching.
In the meantime, the safest course for all facilities is to adopt bylaws
which separate the investigative and adjudicative function to the extent possible
and to ensure that individuals responsible for initiating and conducting
investigations are not a part of the decision making process.
Procedures which combine prosecutorial and adjudicative functions pose
additional problems. Where, for example, a member of the hearing committee
takes an active role against a physician such as offering personal statements
against him or her, a reviewing court would probably view this as an improper
166 Jd.at 836
134 Silberman,supra note 130
1 35 Miller v National Medical Center
,
124 Cal. App. 2d 91, 177 Cal. Rptr.




combination of the prosecutorial and adjudicatory function and find a violation
of due process. 1^6 Any committee member who is to be a witness against
the physician or is otherwise actively involved in prosecuting the charges should
therefore be disqualified from sitting on the hearing panel.
Guideline 4 : The role of counsel at the hearing should be specifically defined
in the medical staff bylaws. This role should allow for the presence, though
not necessarily the active participation, of counsel.
In New Jersey, a physician has the right to have counsel present at
mandated hospital hearings convened to consider an application for admission
to the staff. 1^7 Thjs js the only jurisdiction which has expressed such a right
(though there is some authority that when hospital counsel is to be present
at the hearing the physician should also be entitled to have counsel in
attendance.
*
38 gu t while presence of counsel is to be allowed, New Jersey
retreats to more familiar ground when it describes the role of counsel. The
attorney's participation and role "will be subject to the reasonable rules laid
down by the hospital's board of trustees or other authorized persons and
management and control of the hearings will rest with the person or persons
in charge." 1 ^9
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The discretion vested in the hearing committee is generally extended
in other jurisdictions to the question of whether the physician will be permitted
to be represented by counsel at the hearing. This is a common and arguably
dangerous practice. Surely the purpose of such discretion is to give the
committee power to ensure that the hearing does not become embroiled in
an adversary environment where form overtakes substance. As one writer
put it in his recommendation that the hearing officer hold a pre-hearing
conference with counsel for the physician and counsel for the medical staff*.
Preliminarily, the hearing officer can gain a feeling of the nature
of the two attorneys. ..he can determine — and granted this is
subjective — whether the two counsel are interested in having
a true hearing to arrive at what is fair or whether they are simply
going to make this a showpiece for their own talent or, in some
cases,lack thereof.140
While the goal is a worthy one, the means are questionable. Under this
practice the opportunity for a physician to be represented by counsel turns
less on what is fair and more on the personality of counsel. If an attorney
comes on hard early and tries to discourage a credentials action by legitimate,
though intimidating methods, he or she may find the hearing room door closed
by committee members seeking to show the lawyer whose hospital it really
is or simply because the members don't want to confront the tough lawyer.
The specter of arbitrary and unequal treatment of physicians at credentials
hearings is raised by this discretionary power. Granted, the adversary nature
of the proceeding, and it is adversary, can and should be minimized. But a
placid, passive physician who will not or cannot aggressively defend him or
herself deserves the same exacting scrutiny of charges as the wily old buzzard
who isn't going to let anyone push him around.
* 4 ^ Ginsberg and Diller, Medical Staff Hearings and Questions of Due Process,
Right to Counsel and Liability, 2 Whittier L. Rev. 684 490 (1980)
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New Jersey has taken a step in the right direction in recognizing that
presence does not equal vocal participation. An attorney sitting at the arm
of the client can probe and protect the clinician's interest through the client
himself or herself. Objectionable procedural points can be raised by the clinician
at the prompting of counsel though most major matters of process could and
should be raised and resolved if possible during a pre-conference hearing.
The difficult questions and the critical follow-up inquiries can be directed
so that relevant information is not overlooked. Certainly this side-stage dialogue
could lengthen the time required to complete the hearing but such delays would
not likely be overtaxing and when weighed against the clinician's need for
objective guidance in a difficult and perhaps complex inquiry, it is more than
compensated for by its salutory effect on the process. The committee, through
the hearing officer, (see Guideline 5 infra) still controls the flow of the
proceedings and through appropriate bylaw construction counsel who cannot
abide by the role prescribed can be excluded.
Guideline 5: The bylaws should require that the hearing officer be responsible
for the conduct of the hearing and its process. The hearing officer should
be an impartial individual, functioning as a Parliamentarian and preferably
should have legal training.
There is no great body of law to discuss in conjunction with this
rcommendation though it has been favorably commented upon by at least two
courts. 141 The guiding principles come from the basic requirements of due
process. A credentials hearing is an emotional process for clinician and
committee. An objective voice is needed. While a previously uninvolved
administrator or clinician could serve »
—
the—Pe4e, one cannot ignore the
T4T Klinge
,
523 F. 2d at 62; Woodbury , 447 F. 2d 839
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increasing part played by the use o| threatened use of litigation. Someone
with no party affiliation and with a knowledge of the law's requirements should
oversee the process and ensure that the rules of fairness are being met by
the committee and not being abused by the practitioner. The hearing officer's
primary role is to ensure that all persons involved are aware of the procedural
rules and that those rules are followed. He or she should not participate in
deliberations except to answer procedural questions which arise.
Guidelines 6: Information concerning the basis of adverse action should be
presented by an individual who is not associated with any committee having
an investigatory or adjudicatory role in the proceedings. This individual should
present all available relevant information, including that favorable to the
subject physician.
The hearing officer should not be tasked with presenting the substantive
information to the committee. That role should be assigned to someone outside
the investigative or adjudicative process. 142 This person should understand
that his or her function is not to "beat" the physician but only to ensure that
all information is presented to the committee in an orderly fashion. While
this individual could be the hospital attorney, 143 the better procedure would
be to have a clinician, familiar with the practice of the subject physician if
possible, marshall the material. Assistance in preparing the evidence could
certainly be provided by hospital counsel and the hospital counsel could attend
the hearing in the same non-speaking role as counsel for the physician.
Guideline 7: The party with the burden of proof should be identified in the
bylaws.
14z See , Note 35 and accompanying text
143 Koelling v Board of Trustees of Mary Frances Skiff Mem. Hosp., 146




Is it incumbent upon the medical staff to show that a recommended adverse
action is correct and supported by adequate evidence or is it the initial
responsibility of the physician to show that the action is incorrect, unreasoanble,
arbitrary or capricious? Bylaws placing the burden on the physician have been
ruled valid by the courts deciding the issue, 144 therefore the decision of where
the burden will lie is left to the facility. The hospital bylaws should clearly
specify who has this burden so that the parties understand their respective
responsibilities.
Guideline 8: The physician must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
including the right to present information and question available witnesses.
The hearing should fairly search for the truth underlying the charges.
The physician must be given reasonable opportunity to present any evidence
he or she has to rebut or explain matters before the committee and the
opportunity to explore and expose possible bias or prejudice of witnesses.
However there is no requirement that the hearings adhere to rules of
evidence. 14 <>
Due process does not require that the review committee personally
examine any patients whose treatment is suspect. 14 ^ Since there is no subpoena
power in this administrative hearing the courts have recognized the
impracticality of recognizing a right to confront and cross examine witnesses.
The diffiulty lies in that it may not be possible to persuade witnesses to testify
if they know that they will be subject to cross examination. Even if they do
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begins.^7 Tn i s may be a special problem where a patient has alleged that
the physician made improper sexual advances.
Despite these limitations, every effort should be made to ensure that
the physician has the chance to present all relevant information, documentary
and testimonial, direct and cross examination.
Guideline 9: The bylaws should provide authority to allow a physician to be
summarily suspended whenever action must be taken immediately to protect
patient care.
The language of the above guideline is taken from the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals standards. 148 The protection of human health
and life is a valid governmental and medical interest that permits summary
action preceding a hearing. 149 Summary action based on such considerations
is acceptable provided that the physician is afforded a hearing within a
reasonable period. 1 ^0 Because it is likely that privilege restrictions will have
an immediate, detrimental financial and/or professional impact on a health
care provider, the summary suspension procedure should only be used when
harm to the public is threatened. An example of the improper application
of the sumary procedure is Storrs v Lutheran Hospitals 1 5 1 where a physician's
summary suspension was overturned because it was based on a charge of
disruptiveness or inability to work with others with no related charge concerning
medical competence.
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Hospitals cannot balance and fulfill their responsibilities to the public
and their staff physicians without a well defined credentialing program. This
process needs to include a system of selecting, monitoring and evaluating staff
physicians. When it reveals a physician of questionable qualification or one
who exhibits suspect performance or behavior, the process must allow prompt,
decisive and fair action. With an almost endless variety of possible
circumstances, problems and personalities, a hospital must have a well
conceived, objective fair hearing plan to meet this demand.
Whether or not a hospital agrees with the specifics of the guidlines
presented here, it is necessary to incorporate their underlying policies and
legal principles into the fair hearing plan. The identify and role of the hearing
officer, for example, can be prescribed in many legitmate and acceptable
ways. But if the hospital, through the hearing officer, creates a hearing
environment in which the provider is placed at a serious disadvantage (such
as where the hearing officer is a legally trained advocate for the hospital)
then the hospital may expect serious judicial challenge to adverse credentials
decisions.
In short, hospitals can no longer assume that their staffing decisions
are "in house." While deference to professional judgment still exists, courts
are becoming less reluctant to critically scrutinize the procedure and substance
of peer review. There are many reasons, legal, economic and professional
for implementing a fair hearing plan. If there are good reasons to ignore the
increasing pressure for such a plan they are quickly disappearing under the
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